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WHAT’S THE ISSUE?
CHANGING FRAMES OF ETHANOL POLICY 
IN CONGRESS AND THE MEDIA 
Sarah Weiner
On June 16, 2011 the United States Senate voted by a strong 73-27 majority to dramatically cut tax credits and tari! protections for ethanol producers. "e vote amend-
ed an unsuccessful bill and ultimately did not change the law. "e 
symbolic implications of the vote, however, reverberated through 
the walls of Congress and the pages of the news media. Carolyn 
Lochhead of the San Francisco Chronicle wrote that the vote “under-
mined the once-impregnable political support for corn subsidies” 
while Cli!ord Krauss of the New York Times argued that the action 
marked “a turning point in ethanol politics” (San Francisco Chronicle 
June 17, 2011; New York Times, July 7, 2011). Naftali Bendavid 
and Stephen Power from the Wall Street Journal concluded that the 
amendment “signal[ed] that other long-sacrosanct programs could 
be at risk” (Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2011). 
Long before June 2011, Congress’s mood towards ethanol 
had begun to vacillate. "e initial pro-ethanol consensus that per-
meated national debates in the early 2000s had slowly given way 
to mounting objections from diverse groups who questioned etha-
nol’s touted benefits and highlighted the unintended consequences 
of diverting significant agricultural resources to fuel production. 
Some new ethanol opponents, including environmentalists, began 
to change their position as novel information came to light. New 
issues also began to gradually surface, including ethanol’s impact 
on global food prices and ethanol subsidies’ compliance with inter-
national trade rules. As ethanol became a more “multidimensional” 
issue, members of Congress started to temper their previous en-
thusiasm, tweaking federal biofuels programs accordingly. Support 
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for ethanol, rather than abruptly vanishing, simply ebbed to a par-
ticularly visible nadir with the June 2011 vote. 
"is paper will focus on a particular slice of this story: namely, 
the evolving “frames” used to discuss ethanol policy. Frames are the 
issue areas deemed relevant to the evaluation of a particular pol-
icy. New frames, including global food prices, international trade 
regimes, and the budget deficit, were added across time to older 
ethanol frames, including the environment, agriculture, and energy 
security, to create an increasingly complex issue environment for 
ethanol policymaking. Specifically, this thesis will investigate the 
origination and transmission of these new frames. Often treated 
as a “black box” phenomenon by political scientists, the creation 
and adoption of new policy frames has important implications for 
understanding preference-formation and congressional policymak-
ing. In the pages that follow, I will attempt to address this criti-
cal question. Where did Congress “find” new ethanol frames?  Did 
members of Congress frame ethanol policy for the media, or vice 
versa?  And why did some groups adopt new frames while others 
lagged behind?
WHO FRAMES FOR WHOM?: THEORIES OF FRAMING IN 
THE MEDIA AND CONGRESS
Questions about how frames are constructed, transmitted, 
and received—and corollary questions of who constructs and who 
receives—are contested topics in scholarly literature. "e body of 
work on “framing e!ects” has fractured across several disciplines, 
including communication studies, sociology, and political science, 
erecting barriers to a unified understanding of framing (Druckman 
2010, 279). Additionally, research on framing has disproportion-
ately focused on public opinion as the dependent variable, leav-
ing framing’s impact on elite opinion under-theorized (Chong and 
Druckman 2011, 178). 
Nevertheless, three general theories relating media and elite 
frames can be distilled from the literature: Elite Control, Institu-
tional Fluidity, and Media Control. Because much of the literature 
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on framing does not speak directly to other scholarly works, these 
schools of thought should be viewed as a continuum of general ori-
entations towards framing rather than starkly demarcated theories. 
"e Elite Control theory, owing its roots to empirical political psy-
chology, views framing as a unidirectional process beginning with 
elites, running through the media, and ending with public opinion. 
To theorists from this camp, frames are the tools of strategic politi-
cians seeking to manipulate public opinion; like a river, they can 
only flow downstream. "e Institutional Fluidity school, grounded 
in the agenda-setting literature, views frames as important but un-
predictable variables that influence both elites and public opinion. 
To these scholars, frame-shifting occurs as part of a larger process of 
“punctuated equilibrium,” and frames hold little explanatory power 
independent of larger agenda-changing events. Finally, the Media 
Control orientation views media frames as potentially important 
influences on the frames used by elites. Scholars from this field see 
politicians not as pure rational actors but as culturally-situated and 
cognitively-bounded individuals susceptible to framing e!ects. 
Elite Control
Scholars of the “Elite Control” school of thought see fram-
ing as a tool used by political elites to shape—or, more cynically, 
manipulate—public perceptions and preferences. "e Elite Con-
trol model grew out of a seminal experiment conducted by Kahne-
man and Tversky in 1984. "ese researchers found that changing 
the rhetorical framing of two policies producing mathematically 
identical outcomes could dramatically change subjects’ preferences 
(Entman 1993, 54). Kahneman and Tversky’s work was followed 
by others’, including W.H. Riker’s !e Art of Political Manipula-
tion (1986) and J.R. Zaller’s !e Nature and Origins of Mass Opin-
ion (1992) which, according to Entman (1993, 57), raise “radical 
doubts about democracy itself.”  "ese works conclude that “po-
litical elites control the framing of issues” and question the ability 
of the public to form “true” preferences independent of these elite 
frames (Entman 1993, 57). 
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"e Elite Control scholars vary in their treatment of the me-
dia. While some see the media as essentially “duped” or constrained 
by the supply of information strategically doled out by elites (Sha-
piro and Jacobs 2001, 155), others highlight the potential for the 
media to interrupt the process of frame transmission from political 
elites to the consuming public (Callaghan and Schnell 2005, 11-2). 
Callaghan and Schnell (2005, 11) argue that while many scholars 
“equivocate on just how much the media create their own unique 
frames,” several studies provide evidence that, at least on some is-
sues, the media have been able to assert independent issue frames. 
For example, they note that the media inserted new frames into the 
debate over gun control and resisted adopting some elite frames, 
including those of the pro-gun lobby (Callaghan and Schnell 2005, 
11-2).
"e Elite Control school of thought o!ers a helpful empiri-
cal starting point for the study of framing e!ects. Its grounding 
in political psychology and laboratory-based experiments o!ers es-
sential confirmation of the importance of frames and their ability 
to be transmitted through political communication. "is group of 
theories fails, however, to investigate the impact of framing e!ects 
on elites. Elite Control theories view political elites as strategic, ra-
tional actors who use frames as tools to influence the public. Left 
out, however, is a robust discussion of how frames may indirectly 
a!ect elite behavior by altering public opinion or directly influence 
elite opinion through the same psychological processes that operate 
on the mass public. If frames have such a radical impact on prefer-
ence formation as Kahneman and Tversky (1984), Entman (1993), 
Druckman (2001), and others would have us believe, then why 
should elites be assumed exempt from these strong psychologi-
cal forces?  "is school of thought also assumes that frame trans-
mission is largely synonymous with opinion transmission.  "ese 
authors do not consider the possibility that elites might transmit 
frames without also e!ectively transmitting dictates about how a 
policy would be evaluated in that frame.
Institutional Fluidity
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A second school of thought ascribing to a theory of “Insti-
tutional Fluidity” situates media framing in the wider context of 
the agenda-setting literature. In general, theorists in this school see 
“issue redefinition” as part of a cyclical process of agenda instability 
and change. "ey are less concerned with whether media frames 
a!ect elite frames or vice versa; instead they view the causal arrow 
running both ways in a dynamic feedback loop.
Agriculture policy has long been a favored case study of in-
stitutionalists (Sheingate 2001, 12). First, the close ties between 
agricultural interest groups, congressional committees, and bureau-
crats led scholars to describe agricultural policymaking as an “iron 
triangle” resistant to the intrusion of new interests or policy dimen-
sions (Sheingate 2001, 6). Later, the decline of these agricultural 
iron triangles was cited as evidence of the emergence of more open 
“issue networks” with many openings for diverse political actors 
(Sheingate 2001, 6). Heclo observes that “expanding government” 
fractures interest groups across multiple, di!use programs. He 
writes that “a key factor in the proliferation of groups is the almost 
inevitable tendency of successfully enacted policies unwittingly to 
propagate hybrid interests…[A]ctivist policies greatly increase the 
incentives for groups to form around the di!erential e!ects of these 
policies” (Heclo 1978, 96). Using the vocabulary of framing e!ects, 
we can understand “hybrid interests” and “di!erential e!ects” as the 
building blocks for multidimensional policies subject to various “is-
sue definitions.”   
Scholars of the Institutional Fluidity school of thought as-
sess the media’s role in reframing through the lens of punctuated 
equilibrium. Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 108) argue that the 
media are targets of various groups advancing “noncontradictory 
argumentation,” [sic] a concept we can understand as di!ering 
frames of some policy issue. "ey argue that when one media out-
let shifts focus to one of these various frames, others quickly follow, 
producing a “positive feedback” loop (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 
106). Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 104) thus describe the media 
as “lurching” from one topic to another in much the same pattern 
as policymakers. "ey write, “While underlying facts may change 
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only slowly, media coverage of those facts may shift dramatically 
from positive to negative, or from little attention to a sudden fasci-
nation” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 105). 
Unfortunately, the descriptive appeal of the Institutional 
Fluidity model fails to translate into a rigorous understanding of 
how frames are constructed and communicated. "ese scholars 
tend to view the “punctuations” of punctuated equilibrium as dy-
namic events largely impervious to a generalizable model of change. 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), for example, fail to explain what 
motivates the media to “lurch” from one focus to another or how 
outlets discern which new “noncontradictory argument” [sic] to 
highlight next. Baumgartner et al. (2009, 183) complicate the story 
further, cautioning that potential reframers must contend with a 
“skeptical media” that “will consider new frames presented to them 
with a jaundiced eye.”  "e strong status quo bias Baumgartner et al. 
(2009) observe does much for our understanding of policy stability 
but leaves the process of reframing under-theorized. Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993, 125) openly declare, “Media attention sometimes 
precedes and sometimes follows changes in attention by govern-
ment agencies, so we do not mean to imply any simple causation 
here.”  "e decision to treat reframing as an endogenous product of 
agenda change rather than a potentially influential variable limits 
this theory’s ability to explain elite framing e!ects. 
Where this model fails to theorize a robust model of frame 
change, however, it does implicitly o!er explanation for frame stabil-
ity on the part of issue advocates. Baumgartner et al. (2009, 114-5) 
explain that the status quo bias of agendas may create a “frame” sta-
tus quo bias as well. Using the example of criminal justice reform, 
they argue that despite increased media coverage, “the issue was so 
far o! the formal political agenda that opponents of changes to the 
criminal justice system didn’t even bother to organize” (Baumgart-
ner et al. 2009, 114-5).  In this explanation, status quo supporters 
may fail to respond to reframing attempts because the friction in-
herent in the congressional agenda makes new frames obsolete. If 
defenders of current policies perceive those policies as largely sta-
ble, they may have no incentive to spend scarce time and resources 
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on fighting an ine!ectual reframing e!ort. 
Media Control
Scholarship from the final school of thought, “Media Con-
trol,” is more loosely tied together than the first two schools but 
shares a basic assumption that policymakers face the same psycho-
logical and cognitive limitations as their constituents. Baumgart-
ner and Jones (2005), while adherents to the Institutional Fluid-
ity school, lay important theoretical foundations for a foray into 
more psychological interpretations of elite behavior in their book 
!e Politics of Attention. Baumgartner and Jones (2005, 16) argue, 
“Decision makers in politics, like elsewhere in life, are boundedly 
rational.”  "is may seem straightforward, but this precept starkly 
contrasts with the strategic, coldly-calculating politician as un-
derstood by the Elite Control school of thought. Baumgartner 
and Jones (2005, 16) highlight several psychological di#culties 
facing policymakers, namely “selective attention,” “di#culties with 
trade-o!s,” and “learning.”  "ese cognitive limitations make poli-
ticians and the public alike susceptible to “subjective” evaluations 
of problems biased by the communicative package in which they 
are received. In fact, Baumgartner and Jones (2005, 16) highlight 
that the psychological di#culty we face in comparing unlike things 
creates the capacity for frames to strongly influence our decision 
calculus. "ey write, “Trade-o! calculations, so easily modeled 
in economic choice by indi!erence curves, are extraordinarily dif-
ficult for people to make… [P]roponents almost always ‘frame’… 
information, stressing one perspective and ignore others. "is plays 
to the serial processing capacity of the audience…” (Baumgartner 
and Jones 2005, 16). While Baumgartner and Jones (2005) use 
this discussion to inform their Punctuation Hypothesis, they leave 
much room for further theorizing about the psychological impact 
of frames on elite opinion.
By theorizing politicians as potential frame-recipients, Me-
dia Control theories o!er an evaluative lens that the Elite Control 
and Institutional Fluidity schools do not.  "is theorizing draws 
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on the useful contributions of other fields of research, including 
psychology and sociology, to craft a more robust understanding of 
political elite. Unfortunately, the Media Control school of thought 
lacks strong empirical tests of its theories; case studies and deduc-
tive heuristics stand in for data-based evaluation. Media Control 
theories o!er a valuable starting point in studying framing e!ects 
on elites, but they leave many empirical questions open for further 
investigation and may exaggerate the importance and autonomy of 
media influence. 
Evaluating the Three Theories
"e three schools of thought discussed above—Elite Con-
trol, Institutional Fluidity, and Media Control—each o!er useful 
insights into the question of elite framing e!ects.  "e Elite Con-
trol theory, grounded in empirical and laboratory-based tests, high-
lights the ability of framing to influence preferences and percep-
tions.   "is school fails, however, to contextualize its theories to 
the dynamic process of framing in the real world.  While laboratory 
experiments show the seemingly dangerous power of frames and 
portend a hollowed-out public subject to elite manipulation, the 
operation of frames in actual political discourse is much less omi-
nous.  "e Institutional Fluidity model reflects the importance of 
contextualizing framing in the process of agenda change.  Far from 
functioning as the exclusive tool of elite manipulation, frames can 
open up the political process to new interests and arguments.  "is 
theory fails, however, to specifically theorize the role of frames in 
influencing elite frames or opinions.  "e causal arrow is presumed 
to run both ways.  "e Media Control school of thought does treat 
political elites as potential subjects of framing e!ects, incorporating 
essential findings from other fields of social and laboratory science. 
"is field, however, has thus far failed to produce models of frame 
transmission based on empirical study.  Each field o!ers important 
contributions to a more advanced study of elite framing that in-
cludes empirical research on framing, contextualization of frames 
in larger processes of agenda instability, and a robust understand-
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ing of politicians and their cognitive limitations.  I intend to bor-
row from each of these fields in crafting an empirical case study of 
elite framing e!ects around ethanol policy. 
MEASURING FRAMES
Has media framing been able to influence congressional fram-
ing of ethanol policy?  I hypothesize that as the incidence of new 
media frames increases, so will the use of those frames by members 
of Congress. Furthermore, I expect to find that changes in media 
framing have preceded changes in congressional framing, at least in 
some instances. In its simplest terms, my hypothesis can be mod-
eled as the following:
Incidence of frames used 
by the media
Incidence of frames used by 
Congresspersons
What is a frame and how can we tell it has been transmit-
ted?  For the purposes of this analysis, I define a frame in Druck-
man’s (2010, 280) terms, namely as an indication of the salience of a 
particular issue dimension to the policy issue under consideration. 
"is treatment of framing largely sidesteps the question of prefer-
ence—whether ethanol subsidies are “good” or “bad” policy—and 
focuses the analysis on what dimensions are deemed relevant to the 
formation of those preferences. Separately, I measure whether eth-
anol is evaluated positively or negatively within each frame, but this 
measurement is entirely distinct from whether a frame is present. 
Furthermore, frames can include both “o!ensive” and “defensive” 
posturing (Lehrer 2010, 102). For example, both of the following 
sentences contain an environmental frame: “Ethanol helps fight 
global warming by reducing our use of fossil fuels” and “Ethanol 
does not help reduce carbon emissions because significant amounts 
of petroleum are required for corn farming and ethanol produc-
tion.”  Even though the content of the latter sentence indicates en-
vironmental concerns do not justify ethanol support, the perceived 
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need to answer this argument conveys the impression that the en-
vironment is a salient consideration to ethanol debates.    
A second concept in need of definition is the process of 
frame transmission. How can we know if a Congressperson has 
“received” a frame, allowing the salience of some policy dimension 
to increase relative to others?  "is endeavor would involve signifi-
cant interviews and psychological investigation beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Rather, this empirical analysis focuses on congres-
sional frames instead of framing e!ects on Congress. "e former for-
mulation fashions the statements of Congresspersons, rather than 
Congresspersons themselves, as the dependent variable. Lehrer 
argues that the frames used by Congresspersons reflect the issues 
they have deemed salient in their own personal policy calculations. 
She writes, “"e prevalence of… frames across groups suggests they 
also provided a certain if perhaps intangible utility in policy circles. 
"e fact that they were echoed in the halls of Congress… indicates 
that they resonated with policymakers as well” (Lehrer 2010, 102). 
In this way, congressional frames serve as a proxy for the framing 
e!ects, if any, influencing members of Congress. 
Sample Selection
I create a dataset of “media frames” by sampling from selected 
national and regional newspapers. Focusing on print media may 
ignore potential television- or multimedia-specific framing e!ects, 
but it seems unlikely that a new frame could emerge from one type 
of “the media” without a!ecting other areas. "us print media can 
serve as a useful proxy for media framing in general. Furthermore, 
it would be extremely di#cult to isolate the whole universe of 
television and multimedia communications mentioning “ethanol.” 
Sampling and analyzing print media is far more practical, acces-
sible, and replicable than surveying all media frames. 
To create my media dataset, I use the search engines Nexis, 
ProQuest, and Access World News to generate a population of 
all news articles containing the word “ethanol” and one of several 
words which indicate a reference to federal ethanol policy.  From 
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these search results, I select articles at regular intervals to form a 
su#ciently large-N sample. "is search engine-based technique 
has often been used in other content analysis studies (Neuendorf 
2002, 75), including analyses of agriculture policy (Lehrer 2010, 
124; Wright and Reid 2011, 1392). 
I separate the media dataset into two smaller subsets. "e 
first, representing “national media,” contains articles from the top 
five newspapers in the United States, as measured by circulation 
volume in 2010. "ese include the following, in order from high-
est to lowest circulation: !e Wall Street Journal, USA Today, !e 
New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and !e Washington Post. 
  I limit this sample to the top five national papers because I want 
to include only the most likely sources of Congresspersons’ “na-
tional news.”  While containing local content, each of these papers 
attempts to o!er significant coverage of national stories and events. 
"e second media data subset, representing “regional media,” con-
tains “local and regional” papers, as classified by the Access World 
News search engine. I divide the United States into four regions—
South, West, Midwest, and Northeast—as shown in Figure 1 (on-
line). Importantly, the 12 states contained in the Midwest region 
also represent the 12 states with the largest ethanol output and 
production capacity in 2010 and 12 of the top 13 corn-producing 
states of 2010 (Schnepf 2010, 15; National Corn Growers Asso-
ciation 2011, 12).
I measure “Congressional frames” using statements entered 
into the congressional Record. "e congressional Record (CR) 
holds a nearly verbatim account of congressional floor proceedings 
as well as “extensions” of floor remarks voluntarily added to the CR 
by members of Congress. "e CR presents the unique advantages 
of a centrally-organized, searchable database of public statements 
by Congresspersons. Some may argue that the CR is a less “public” 
source of frames than campaign speeches or press releases. How-
ever, rarely does a Congressperson give a congressional floor speech 
without considering the potential public reception of his or her 
comments. Additionally, to the extent that the CR may reflect the 
less publicized thoughts of politicians, it may further elucidate un-
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derlying assumptions about issue salience that become edited out 
of more high-profile statements. 
To create a dataset from the CR, I follow a similar proce-
dure to that used in the creation of my media datasets. Omitting 
entries from the “Daily Digest,” a summary of each day’s proceed-
ings, I search for all entries in the CR including the word “ethanol.” 
"e CR contains statements by Congresspersons as well as the 
text of bills, amendments, and other congressional business; only 
statements which can be attributed to a single speaker are coded. 
When a single entry contains multiple short speeches from various 
Congresspersons, the statement of the first speaker who mentions 
“ethanol” is coded.
My dataset includes news articles and CR entries from 
September 1, 2005 through September 1, 2011. "is times-
pan includes an arc of congressional support for ethanol, begin-
ning from its apex in 2005 and descending to its nadir in 2011. 
  "is time period includes variation in ethanol’s popularity, ethanol 
policy, and ethanol frames. Six years should be a wide enough time 
period to capture “transmission” e!ects, if any exist.  
Methodology
My thesis utilizes content analysis, “the systematic, objective, 
quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf 2002, 
1). Content analysis relies on the rigorous creation of a universally-
applicable coding scheme which allows for the “measurement” of 
text. I record many di!erent characteristics of each document in 
my dataset, including potentially relevant identifying information, 
the document’s stated or implied “opinion” on ethanol policy, and 
the frames used in each document when discussing ethanol.
Each document in the dataset is coded on the basis of nine 
frame categories: budget, economy, trade, food prices, energy de-
pendence, energy prices, environment, agriculture, and other. Each 
frame is assigned a simple binary present/not present score. "us a 
score of “1” means that a particular frame is used in the document; a 
score of “0” means that the frame is not used. A frame is considered 
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present if the issue area it covers is presented by the document as 
a relevant consideration to discussion of ethanol policy. "e frame 
could be positive or negative, an “o!ensive” argument or a “defense” 
rejoinder. As long as the frame is presented, its rhetorical or strate-
gic use by the author is considered irrelevant to this score. 
Content analysis poses several unique methodological chal-
lenges. First, creating a robust research design requires generating 
a pre-determined list of code-able variables before the analysis be-
gins (Neuendorf 2002, 11). An inductive approach which creates 
a “running list” of ethanol frames, for example, would fail to pro-
duce a uniform classification system. "is approach would o!er no 
avenue for comparing discrete frame categories against each other. 
To address this problem, I selected a sub-sample of 60 documents 
from my dataset and from them induced this list of mutually exclu-
sive frame categories. 
"e second puzzle posed by content analysis is the need to 
craft a valid coding scheme which approximates an objective mea-
surement. If only one individual can use the scheme, or if multiple 
individuals produce significantly di!erent measurements, then the 
coding scheme has little utility as a tool of measurement. I attempt 
to improve “intercoder reliability” in several ways. First, I produced 
a uniform coding manual which provides step-by-step instruc-
tions for coding and definitions of code values. I hired a student 
research assistant to code approximately half of my dataset, and 
we went through several iterations of the “code book” before arriv-
ing at a finalized draft which consistently produced agreement in 
our codes. Second, after working together to develop consensus on 
many “trial” documents, my research assistant and I did not con-
sult each other while coding the actual dataset. We intentionally 
“double-coded” slightly more than 10% of the dataset, giving us a 
good baseline to compare our agreement and test the reliability of 
our coding throughout the dataset (Neuendorf 2002, 51). "ird, 
I randomized the order of the dataset and the assignment of each 
document to a coder.  "is randomly disperses coding errors across 
the sample, preventing di!erences in coders from appearing as sig-
nificant chronological patterns.
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Assessing the quality of intercoder agreement produced 
by these e!orts is a complicated endeavor. Measured as a simple 
proportion of instances of agreement divided by total oppor-
tunities for agreement, intercoder reliability reaches the high 
score of 90.5% (Neuendorf 2002, 143). However, this calcula-
tion includes a high proportion of mutual “not present” scores. 
  We are less interested in the instances in which both coders as-
sessed a frame to be absent than when only one coder assessed 
a frame to be present. In the sub-sample of double-coded docu-
ments, approximately 7% of documents are mutual 1s while about 
9% are 1-0s (or 0-1s). In stark contrast to our promising 90.5% 
score, this seems disappointing. However, several factors caution 
against assessing intercoder reliability to be irrecoverably low. First, 
this “1-0” measure e!ectively double counts errors. If we assume 
that when disagreement exists, one coder is “right” and the other 
is “wrong,” then only half of the “1-0” measure reflects an error. 
Given the subjective nature of framing, it would be impossible to 
determine whether the 1 reflects an “over count” or the 0 reflects an 
“under count.”  It is unlikely, however, that in every instance when 
coders would have disagreed in the larger dataset, the actual coder 
was the “wrong” one. Second, the null hypothesis implicit in the 
“1-0” measure would predict the mutual 1 count to be much lower 
than measured. If coding were operating by chance, we would ex-
pect 25% mutual 1’s, 50% 1-0 or 0-1s, and 25% mutual 0s. Com-
pared to these changes, the mutual 1’s in the sample are much larger 
than we would expect. Finally, these 1-0 “errors” may in fact have an 
analytical benefit. Frames that are clearly present are more likely 
to be coded as mutual 1’s than questionably present frames. In ef-
fect, a 1-0 score in the subsample reflects that these “questionable” 
frames were only coded about half of the time in the actual dataset. 
"us, the dataset likely “over counts” strongly present frames vis-à-
vis weakly present ones, e!ectively generating a weighted score out 
of the assessed binary present/not present score. "e subsample 
does not show any systemic under- or over-counting by any one 
coder (meaning the proportion of 1-0s to 0-1s is close to 50/50), 
adding further support to the notion that 1-0s reflect weakly pres-
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ent frames instead of systemic coder error.
Before proceeding to my results, two further caveats are in 
order. First, sample size plays a large role in measuring the presence 
or absence of frames. Although over 700 documents are coded, the 
per-frame count is only a fraction of this number. "is means that 
some nuance is lost in analyzing patterns of transmission for each 
frame. Instances of frame leaders or followers may be missed in 
sampling, making patterns more di#cult to detect. Second, begin-
ning the dataset in September 2005 may exclude interesting frame 
transmission patterns from earlier years. It is possible that in in-
stances where no leaders appear present, frame leadership in fact 
occurred before the time period included in the dataset. 
The Dataset
"e complete dataset includes 702 documents. Of those 
cases, 499 are codeable observations, defined as a document con-
taining requisite identifying information and at least one frame of 
ethanol. "is dataset is the product of three separate samples of 
the congressional Record, national media, and regional media. At-
tempts were made to generate roughly equal numbers of observa-
tions in each of these categories to create more comparable data. 
To achieve this comparability, each document type was sampled at 
a di!erent rate. After generating the universe of documents con-
taining “ethanol” with various search engines, every fifth CR docu-
ment, every fifteenth national media document, and one out of ev-
ery 150 regional media documents was selected for inclusion in the 
sample. "is generated three roughly equal subsamples, with 153 
CR documents, 155 national media documents, and 191 regional 
media documents.  "is sampling procedure aids in comparing the 
relative prevalence of frames across document types, but it washes 
out any absolute di!erences in framing e!ects. For example, many 
more regional media documents than CR records appeared in the 
universe of documents containing a discussion of “ethanol,” yet the 
sampling procedure has intentionally equalized this di!erence. 
  "is is not a significant limitation; after all, the original universe of 
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documents created by search engines does not include every frame 
communicated by Congress or the media, so any attempt at making 
absolute comparisons would be misguided. However, this caveat 
should be kept in mind when interpreting graphs and results. 
Ethanol Policies and Opinions
Over the past four decades, the federal government has rolled 
out a wide array of support for the biofuel industry, including loans, 
grants, tax credits, subsidies, fuel mandates, and tari! protections. 
In 2009, total outlays for these programs ranged between to $6 and 
$8 billion (Schnepf 2010, 1). Among this thicket of programs cov-
ering an array of biofuels, three principle ethanol policies stand out: 
the ethanol import tari!, the volumetric ethanol excise tax credit 
(VEETC), and the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) (Schnepf 
2011, 3).  Figure 2 displays a timeline of these programs, mapped 
against growing ethanol production. 






























Note: Ethanol production data from the Renewable Fuels Association, 
2011, http://www.ethanolrfa.org/pages/statistics
73Journal of Politics & Society
"e period from 2000 to 2005 saw three major pieces of legis-
lation that significantly impacted ethanol policy. "e first, the Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, was the first farm bill 
to include an explicit energy title (Schnepf 2011, 3). Responding 
to rising domestic and international oil prices, Congress included 
several programs designed to spur increased research and use of 
biofuels (Schnepf 2011, 3). "e next major ethanol provision, the 
VEETC, originated in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 
(Schnepf 2011, 3). "e VEETC provides a 45 cent tax credit for 
every gallon of ethanol that oil companies blend into their gasoline 
(Schnepf 2010, 22). Finally, in 2005 Congress passed the Energy 
Policy Act (EPACT). Among other programs, EPACT created a 
renewable fuels mandate which required 4 billion gallons of etha-
nol to be used in 2006, followed by increasing target levels through 
2012. "is first Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS1) set a guaran-
teed demand “floor” and, along with petroleum disruptions on the 
heels of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, enabled ethanol production 
to skyrocket (Schnepf 2010, 9).
Biofuel policy after 2005 began to target a slightly more di-
versified profile of renewables. "e Energy Independence Act of 
2007 (EISA) created a second, modified RFS (RFS 2) which man-
dated nine billion gallons of renewable fuel be used in 2008 and 36 
billion by 2022 (Schnepf 2010, 10). RFS2 allowed only 15 billion 
gallons of corn ethanol to count towards the mandate, leaving the 
rest to be met by cellulosic and “advanced” biofuels (Schnepf 2010, 
10). "e 2008 Farm Bill echoed Congress’s “refocus” away from 
corn ethanol, enacting new programs to support the research and 
development of “advanced” fuels (Schnepf 2011, 4). Despite these 
modifications to the RFS and new R&D programs, the other two 
centerpieces of federal ethanol policy—the import tari! and the 
VEETC—remained staunchly intact. 
"at changed on December 31, 2011 when the import tari!, 
VEETC, and other subsidies were allowed to expire, “ending an era 
in which the federal government provided more than $20 billion 
in subsidies for use of the product” (New York Times, January 1, 
2012). "is expiration had been preceded in June by a Senatorial 
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test-balloon amendment which, had its parent-bill passed, would 
have prematurely cut these subsidies before their end-of-year sun-
set. As of this writing in early 2012, the only leg of the ethanol 
support tripod that remains standing is the RFS, and this man-
date continues to de-emphasize corn ethanol with each additional 
benchmark requirement.  It remains to be seen what modifications, 
if any, the 2012 Farm Bill will make to federal ethanol policy. 
Geographic Characteristics
In the United States, corn production is primarily concen-
trated in the Midwest.  "ere is much geographic overlap between 
the areas of high corn growth and areas with a high concentration 
of ethanol plants (Figure 3). In 2010, the nine states which pro-
duced over 500 million bushels of corn* were also the nine states 
with the greatest ethanol output and production capacity (Nation-
al Corn Growers Association 2011, 12; Schnepf 2010, 15). Unsur-
prisingly, corn ethanol’s importance to these Midwestern states has 
translated into the voting behavior of their political representatives 
(Schnepf 2010, 22). In the June 2011 Senate vote to repeal ethanol 
subsidies, for example, only one of 18 Senators from these top nine 
states defected and voted in favor of the amendment. 
*  In order, from greatest to least: Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska,  Minnesota, Indiana, Kansas, South 
Dakota, Ohio, Wisconsin
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Figure 3. US Corn Production and Ethanol Capacity, 2007
Reprinted from Paul C. Westcott, “U.S. Ethanol Expansion Driving 
Changes throughout the Agricultural Sector,” September 2007, http://www.ers.
usda.gov/AmberWaves/September07/Features/Ethanol.htm
"is regional concentration of ethanol production is also pres-
ent in ethanol discussions.  Both the CR and regional media samples 
display a regional bias in the presence of documents which mention 
and include at least one frame regarding ethanol. Unsurprisingly, 
the Midwest region represents the largest chunk of the sample, al-
though the South is a close second (Figure 4). In both the South 
and West, Texas and California, respectively, seem to be inflating 
regional document counts. Although the South is generally a low 
corn- and ethanol-producing area, Texas is the partial exception. 
Texas is the twelfth largest corn producer and is ranked tenth in 
overall ethanol production facilities (National Corn Growers As-
sociation 2011). "e importance of ethanol in Texas, combined 
with its large population, helps to explain the large Southern rep-
resentation in the sample. "e Northeast is by far the least-active 
region, representing just over 11 percent of the sample and contain-
ing just around one-half of the documents of the West, the third-
ranked region. As we might expect, ethanol and ethanol policy are 
talked about more by Congresspersons and media outlets from the 
Midwest and South, where corn and ethanol are relatively impor-
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 tant, than by Congresspersons and newspapers in the West and 
Northeast. 
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Changing Opinions on Ethanol Policy
In general, federal ethanol policy has followed a parabolic path 
over time, slowly increasing throughout the 80s and 90s, peaking 
around 2005, and declining precipitously from 2006 to late 2011. 
"is dataset, beginning in September 2005 and concluding in Sep-
tember 2011, captures the latter half of this parabola.  "is period 
of time saw both significant changes in the frequency of ethanol 
discussions and the opinions towards ethanol support expressed in 
those discussions by both Congresspersons and the media.
Discussions of ethanol were much more prevalent in the pe-
riod from 2006 to early 2008 than in later years, although there 
was a moderate spike around 2011. "is higher volume* in the 
2006-2008 periods makes sense in context of the congressional 
agenda; debates over the 2007 Energy Independence Act and 2008 
Farm Bill were in full swing during these years. "e relative period 
*  “High” here is only used as a relative term comparing ethanol discussions across time. Due 
to sampling methods, this dataset does not allow us to measure absolute prevalence of ethanol 
discussions.  
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of “quiet” in the sample from mid-2008 to early 2011 mirrors the 
absence of significant ethanol legislation in Congress during this 
time period. Similarly, the moderate uptick in ethanol discussions 
in 2011 occurred simultaneously with debates in the Senate over 
the amendment to end ethanol subsidies and with general debates 
over federal expenditures during budget negotiations. In this sense, 
the congressional agenda influences the prevalence of ethanol dis-
cussions in both the CR and media outlets. "e curves for the CR 
and a combined “media” set look similar (Figure 5, online). Some 
might argue that this proves strategic politicians can “manipulate” 
media coverage, but that would be an overly-cynical interpretation 
of a predictable phenomenon. "e media covers news, and congres-
sional lawmaking qualifies as news. More interesting would be if 
Congresspersons could influence how the media frames their cover-
age of ethanol. As we will see in later chapters, that is a significantly 
murkier picture.
Opinions towards ethanol show a decidedly negative trend 
over time, generally mirroring waning support in congressional 
policies. Each document in the dataset was coded for the presence 
and direction of the speaker or author’s “opinion” on ethanol sup-
port. Most CR statements (almost 80% of codeable observations) 
expressed an opinion on whether federal ethanol promotion should 
remain the same, increase, or decrease. Statements supporting the 
status quo or an increase in ethanol support were coded as favor-
able opinions; statements favoring a decrease in ethanol support 
were coded as unfavorable opinions. In contrast to the CR, only 
about 30% of observations from national and regional newspapers 
expressed an opinion on ethanol support. Given the norms of ob-
jective journalism, this di!erence seems plausible and reasonable. 
"is skew could make us hesitant to discuss “overall” opinions on 
ethanol, given the bias towards the CR. However, if we think about 
both the national and regional media as representing one “media” 
group, then the number of CR documents and the number of me-
dia documents expressing an opinion on ethanol is roughly even.*  
*  Exactly 123 CR documents express an opinion, in contrast to 41 and 61 national media and 
regional media documents, respectively. "e combined “media” dataset contains 102 documents 
expressing an opinion.
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Figure 6. Monthly Opinion on Ethanol Support from Sept. 
2005–Sept. 2011
Figure 6 shows the number of documents expressing a favor-
able opinion on federal ethanol support over time as compared to 
documents expressing a negative opinion. Both the clustering and 
height of the bars in Figure 6 are important. Each bar represents 
about one month, so the height of each bar represents the number 
of documents expressing a positive (or negative) opinion in that 
amount of time. A tight cluster of bars shows that this phenom-
enon continued in following months. Figure 6 shows that nega-
tive opinions on ethanol support were by no means rare as early 
as 2006, but the number of documents expressing a positive opin-
ion in 2006 far outweighed those making an objection (39 and 13, 
respectively). From 2007 to 2008 the tide began to turn against 
ethanol support, with the tone of CR and media documents be-
coming conspicuously negative by the end of 2008 and beginning 
of 2009. In 2007, the number of positive and negative documents 
were almost dead even (28 and 27, respectively), but in 2008 and 
2009 negative evaluations comprised two-thirds of documents 
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which o!ered an opinion. "e following two years were a period of 
relatively few ethanol debates, but when discussion picked up again 
in 2011 the overwhelming consensus was against ethanol. In 2011, 
22 documents expressed a negative opinion on ethanol, compared 
to only 2 supporters. 
Figure 7. Opinion on Ethanol Support as a Weighted Score, Sept. 
2005 – Sept. 2011
Figure 7 shows the relative weight of these negative opinions 
as a proportion of all ethanol discussions. "is weighted score al-
lows us to control for the fact that ethanol was simply talked about 
more during the period from 2006 to 2008 than from 2009 to 
2011. First, a raw score was generated for each time period such 
that: 
Raw opinion score = Number of documents with a positive 
opinion – number of documents with a negative opinion
Next, this raw opinion score was divided by the total number 
of observations in a given time period to generate a weighted opin-
ion score. "is weighted score shows that, for example, 100% of all 
documents in several months in 2011 were entirely negative. Figure 
7 shows that while opinion on ethanol was mostly negative from 
late 2007 until late 2010, negativity became the dominant feature 
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of discussion by 2011. 
Figure 8. Opinion on Ethanol Support by Document Type
A final feature of this changing opinion is a noticeable dis-
tinction between opinion in the CR and media outlets (Figure 8). 
In general, when national and regional newspapers do express an 
opinion on ethanol, those opinions are largely negative. "e media 
covers negative opinions twice as often as it does positive ones. In 
contrast, the CR is disproportionately approving of federal etha-
nol support. In the CR, positive opinions are twice as frequent 
as negative ones. Over time, the CR pattern follows the general 
opinion trend described above, but the CR is clearly lagging (Fig-
ure 9, online). From September 2005 through 2007, the CR was 
overwhelmingly positive; 88.5% of all speakers express a favorable 
opinion towards federal ethanol support in this period.   "e CR 
began to flirt with negative opinions in the period from 2008 to 
2010, with about 45% of speakers expressing a negative opinion. By 
2011, Congresspersons’ opinions became decidedly negative. In the 
9 months of 2011 included in the studied time period, 88.9% of all 
speakers stated a negative opinion on federal ethanol support, the 
mirror image of ethanol’s strong support in 2006 and 2007. 
Further digging shows that a sharp regional divide explains 
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much of the variation in opinions. Even though the CR tends to be 
more positive than the media, a large chunk of this support can be 
attributed to members of Congress from the Midwest (Figure 10, 
online). In fact, the CR entries from Congresspersons from both 
the South and the West contain more negative statements than 
positive ones. When compared to the coverage in other regions, 
Midwestern newspapers seem disproportionately complimentary 
of ethanol support as well. "is e!ect is dramatic but not unexpect-
ed; corn and ethanol are much more important to the readership 
and constituents of Midwestern Congresspersons and newspapers 
than in any other region. From our data, it would be impossible to 
say whether this bias is pandering (i.e. intentional misrepresenta-
tion or overstatement of ethanol’s benefits) or simply a di!erence of 
opinions based on local experiences. In other words, we cannot say 
whether Midwestern documents are more supportive of ethanol 
because the speakers and writers believe ethanol is good or because 
they believe they must say ethanol is good to maintain votes and 
circulation numbers. 
Figure 10. Regional Variation in Opinion on Ethanol Support
Ethanomics
Like many issue areas, ethanol has a unique political economy 
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shaped by federal policies, regional concentrations, and changing 
opinions. "ree main themes should be remembered as we move 
forward to discuss ethanol’s frame environment. First, despite ag-
riculture’s billing as an area characterized by a stable “iron triangle” 
of policy makers and implementers, ethanol policy has been far 
from static. Federal ethanol programs underwent many changes 
during the studied time period, creating ample opportunities and 
incentives for framing and re-framing. Second, ethanol production 
is geographically concentrated in the Midwest. "is geographical 
concentration has significantly influenced the ways in which etha-
nol has been framed inside and outside of the Corn Belt. Finally, 
federal ethanol support has su!ered a striking fall from grace since 
its heyday in the middle of the decade. Although varying substan-
tially across regions and sources, this decline in opinion has impor-
tant implications for ethanol’s framing by Congresspersons and the 
media. 
THE ETHANOL FRAME ENVIRONMENT
"e frames that are used to describe an issue area carry great 
importance for policymaking. "ey shape the agenda, structure po-
tential coalitions, and influence the preferences of politicians and 
their constituents. "e ways that the media and Congresspersons 
obtain and transmit frames is thus enormously important to larger 
questions in American politics, including the manner in which in-
cumbents represent (or manipulate) constituent preferences, the 
ways in which opinions on an issue change over time, and the tenor 
and content of “public debate.”  
Using content analysis, I examine the use of nine di!erent 
ethanol frames (Figure 11, online). Across the studied period of 
time, the most used frame was the environment, followed closely 
by energy dependence, agriculture, and energy prices. "e budget 
and economy frames were used relatively infrequently, although 
some of this is explained by their variation over time. "e trade 
frame was used rarely (only seven times in a sample of almost 500 
codeable documents), so I will largely ignore this category in future 
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analysis. I will briefly describe each of the remaining frame catego-
ries (excluding “trade” and “other”), focusing particular attention on 
variation across time and whether each frame is used to positively 
or negatively evaluate ethanol policy. At the outset, I lump together 
CR and media frames in one measurement in order to better con-
vey the general contours of ethanol’s frame environment. While re-
ducing precision, this combination creates a denser time series and 
improves the overall “broad strokes” picture of ethanol framing. In 
the following chapter I will then split apart these document types 
to analyze patterns of transmission between these subcategories. 
Budget
A document is defined as having used the “budget” frame if 
it discusses ethanol support as an issue which impacts the federal 
budget. Potential topics include discussion of the deficit, “govern-
ment waste,” revenue, or “taxpayer dollars.”  In general, the budget 
frame was used sparsely from 2005 to 2010, but its use skyrock-
eted during 2011 (Figure 12). "is spike in the use of the budget 
frame occurred alongside debates in the Senate over ending etha-
nol subsidies and congressional budget battles in the summer of 
2011. Furthermore, the budget frame became a dominant feature 
of all ethanol framing during this year (Figure 13, online). Figure 13 
shows the proportion of codeable observations which included a 
budget frame during the period of study. It shows that not only did 
the use of the budget frame increase in 2011, but the budget frame 
became a prominent feature of most discussions of ethanol. Put 
another way, budgetary considerations seemed so salient to discus-
sions of ethanol that it seemed out of the ordinary for a speaker 
or author to mention ethanol without discussing its impact on the 
budget. 
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When coding documents, each frame was assigned an “evalu-
ation” score. "is score measured whether ethanol support would 
be considered “good” or “bad” if the given frame was the only met-
ric of consideration. "e evaluation was considered positive if the 
frame was used either o!ensively or defensively. For example, if a 
document said, “Ethanol support does not create a large burden 
on the national budget,” then ethanol would have been evaluated 
positively in the budget frame. "is coding scheme accounts for the 
potential existence of both a#rmative arguments and rejoinders in 
the changing discussion of ethanol policy. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature of the frame and the 
time at which its use became most prominent, the budget frame is 
a highly “negative” frame (Figure 14, online). Figure 14 shows the 
“Evaluation Score” of the budget frame, defined as the di!erence 
between the number of documents evaluating ethanol “positively” 
in the budget frame and the number of documents evaluating etha-
nol “negatively” in the budget frame. A negative score indicates that 
for a given time period, more negative documents were written than 
positive documents. "e greater the absolute value of a score, the 
greater the imbalance between negative and positive documents. 
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For the budget frame, evaluations were almost entirely negative, be-
coming strongly so in 2011. "is phenomenon is not due to “closely 
contested” evaluations from 2006 to 2010, but rather a general ab-
sence of positive framing. In fact, across the studied time period 
only 5 documents frame ethanol positively in the budget frame, as 
opposed to 48 evaluating ethanol negatively. "us, budget evalua-
tions did not become more negative because negative evaluations 
eventually outweighed positive evaluations, but rather because the 
number of negative evaluations skyrocketed without ever having 
competed with positive evaluations for bandwidth.
Economy
A document is defined as having used the “economy” frame if 
it discusses ethanol as an issue that impacts the national economy 
(outside of the agricultural sector) or jobs. Potential topics include, 
but are not limited to, discussion of employment, inflation, and the 
gross domestic product (GDP). "e economy frame does not show 
much variation over time. It follows the same curve as overall ob-
servations: more use in the period from 2006-2008, a relative peri-
od of quiet from 2009-2011, and a moderate spike after 2011. "is 
indicates that variation in the use of the economy frame is mostly 
due to changes in overall levels in ethanol discussions instead of 
some variable unique to the frame itself.  
Figure 15, online shows that the economy frame is generally 
positive and does not change much over time. Unlike the budget 
frame, however, the economy evaluation is more “contested.”  Even 
though the majority of documents containing the economy frame 
evaluate ethanol positively in this dimension (73%), a discernible 
handful of documents o!er the opposite conclusion (24%).* 
Food Prices
A document is defined as having used the “food prices” frame 
if it discusses ethanol as an issue that impacts the price of food 
*  "e unaccounted 3% is attributable to documents o!ering neutral evaluations. 
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for consumers, either domestically or internationally. A document 
which only discusses food prices as an input cost for agricultural 
producers, such as livestock and poultry farmers, does not qualify 
as having used the food prices frame. "ese latter types of framing 
are coded only as agricultural frames. "is distinction may seem 
trivial, but it lies at the heart of ethanol framing. Whether ethanol-
induced changes in grain prices are considered a concern for con-
sumers in general or only for agricultural producers is a crucial detail 
when examining what issue areas are deemed salient to ethanol 
discussions. 
"e use of the food prices frame showed a slight but notice-
able uptick in late 2007, growing into a large spike in 2008 (Figure 
16). "is upsurge in the use of the food prices frame corresponded 
with a rise in global food prices, sparking economic troubles and 
political unrest in many of the world’s developing countries (FAO 
2012). Global prices eased in the beginning of 2009 but then began 
to climb again, topping 2008’s highs by 2011 (FAO 2012). "e 
use of the food prices frame closely mirrored the 2008 spike in 
food prices, growing steadily as the global Food Price Index rose. 
"e frame curve also increased along with global food prices in the 
2009 to 2011 period; however, the magnitude of the increase in 
frame use relative to the increase in food prices was much smaller 
than it was in the 2007 to 2008 period. In other words, the use of 
the food prices frame tended to increase as food prices rose across 
the whole 2005 to 2011 time period, but this a!ect was stronger 
before 2008 than after (Figure 16). 
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Figure 16. Use of the Food Prices Frame and the Food Price In-
dex, Sept. 2005 – Sept. 2011
Note: Food Price Index based on international prices of a basket of food 
commodities. Data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 2012, faostat.fao.org
"ere are a number of potential explanations for this dis-
crepancy, including the possibility of a “boy who cried wolf ” e!ect. 
After the food price crisis of 2008 abated, Congresspersons and 
newspapers may have been less inclined to react to a second surge 
in prices. Alternatively, ethanol opponents may have found the food 
prices frame less useful after passage of the 2008 Farm Bill which, 
along with the 2007 Renewable Fuel Standard, signaled a shift in 
emphasis towards cellulosic ethanol. "is refocus was due in part 
to concerns over the link between corn ethanol use and rising food 
prices. After these policies were passed and food prices continued 
to climb, ethanol opponents may have decided that the link was too 
tenuous or that the necessary corrective policies were too extreme; 
thus, they decreased their use of the food prices frame. 
Much like the budget frame, the food prices frame is over-
whelmingly negative. Out of 88 documents which o!ered some 
evaluation in the food prices frame, only three evaluated ethanol 
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policy positively.*  "is indicates that little “debate” occurred over 
ethanol’s impact on food prices; those who used the frame over-
whelmingly agreed that ethanol support adversely impacts food 
prices. Interestingly, this consensus is not reflected in the academic 
literature on the subject, which o!ers mixed interpretations of eth-
anol’s impact on food prices (Wallander, Claassen, and Nickerson 
2011, 2).  
Energy Dependence and Energy Prices
A document is defined as having used the “energy dependence” 
frame if it discusses ethanol as an issue that impacts the United 
States’ dependence on energy from foreign sources. "is frame may 
be explicit or implied. For example, the sentence “Ethanol helps 
meet energy policy goals by promoting the domestic production of 
energy” uses an energy dependence frame without explicitly men-
tioning reliance on foreign oil producers. "e “energy prices” frame 
discusses ethanol as an issue that impacts the price of other sources 
of energy, including gasoline, natural gas, and alternative fuels. 
"ese frames are somewhat similar, but they tend to be used 
to make di!erent arguments. "e energy dependence frame is gen-
erally discussed in terms of national security, highlighting the threat 
of a sudden supply bottleneck or foreign manipulation. "e energy 
prices frame, in contrast, focuses more on pocketbook issues facing 
the regular consumer paying “higher prices as the pump.”  When a 
document notes the impact of energy dependence on prices, both 
frames are coded as present. While these frames overlap more often 
than other frame pairs, their co-incidence is low enough to caution 
against combining them into a single category. Only 36% of docu-
ments containing an energy price frame also contain an energy de-
pendence frame, and only 19% of documents containing an energy 
dependence frame also contain an energy price frame.
"e two energy frames do, however, follow a similar pattern 
of use across time. Figure 17, online shows that both frames are 
*  Because so few documents evaluated ethanol positively in the food prices frame, no 
accompanying figure was included. 
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used more prevalently in the period from 2006 to 2008 than from 
2009 to 2011. "is timing corresponds with debates over energy 
in the run-up to the 2007 Energy Independence Act and the 2008 
Farm Bill as well as with changes in retail gas prices. As the eco-
nomic downturn dragged prices down in late 2008, use of these 
energy frames fell as well (Cooper 2011). However, the steady and 
significant recovery of gas prices since this time was not mirrored 
in energy frame use. Figure 18 shows this trend starkly. Figure 18 
shows the use of the energy prices frame as compared to the price 
of gasoline in the first week of each month from September 2005 
to September 2011. From 2006 to 2008, the use of the energy price 
frame spiked concurrently with gas prices in the summer months, 
when they tend to be highest. "is trend did not, however, con-
tinue into 2009. "e use of the energy prices frame fell o! precipi-
tously in 2009 along with gas prices, but only the latter recovered 
significantly over time. 
Figure 18. Use of the Energy Prices Frame and Gas Prices, Sept. 
2005 – Sept. 2011
Note: Price of gasoline based on the regular conventional retail gasoline 
price in the first week of each month. Data from the United States Energy Infor-
mation Administration, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/
Both energy frames are generally positive. Sixty-eight percent 
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of documents using the energy dependence frame and 64% of doc-
uments using the energy prices frame evaluate ethanol positively. 
In general, however, evaluations within both of these frames trend 
negatively over time. Figure 19, online shows that the energy de-
pendence frame was overwhelmingly positive in 2006; over 80% of 
documents containing the frame evaluated ethanol favorably. "is 
supportive opinion began to wane, however, as slow-to-develop 
fueling infrastructure caused many to begin questioning ethanol’s 
ability to make a serious dent in oil dependence. "is negative sen-
timent became particularly noticeable in 2008 when positive evalu-
ations dropped to just barely 50%, continuing to hover just slightly 
over the 50% mark for the rest of the studied time period. Figure 
20, online shows a slightly starker trend in energy price evaluations, 
although this may be due to the lower number of total observa-
tions using the energy prices frame. Evaluations of ethanol in the 
energy prices frame were largely positive (72%) in 2005 and 2006. 
After this time, evaluations became more mixed, although still net-
positive (58%). 
Environment
A document is defined as having used the “environment” 
frame if it discusses ethanol as an issue which impacts any aspect of 
the environment, including global warming, pollution levels, ocean 
quality, soil erosion, deforestation, and sustainable farming practic-
es. As an absolute count, the environment frame was most prevalent 
in the period from 2006 to 2008 (Figure 21, online). However, as a 
percent of all codeable documents, the environment was presented 
as a more salient consideration to ethanol in the period from 2009 
to 2011 (Figure 22, online). In the end, it appears a considerable 
number of authors and speakers treat ethanol as an “environment 
issue” across time, and this group of people kept talking in 2009 
and 2010 when most others were silent on ethanol policy. 
"e environment is the most mixed of all frames in terms 
of ethanol evaluation (Figure 23). About 40% of documents using 
the environment frame evaluate ethanol positively and about 47% 
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evaluate it negatively (the remainder take a neutral position). "is 
is unsurprising given the rigorous debate in the academic litera-
ture over the impact of ethanol use on the environment and the 
many di!erent aspects of “the environment” which ethanol a!ects. 
Ethanol use is more carbon-neutral than fossil fuels, but the picture 
becomes murkier if one considers the entire seed-to-engine cycle 
of ethanol production. Several unanticipated externalities of in-
creased corn cropping may also accompany ethanol use, including 
soil erosion, intense fertilizer use and “dead zone” growth, and de-
forestation (Scharlemann and Laurance 2008, 43-4). Overall Fig-
ure 23 shows a mixed but negative-trending picture of evaluations 
in the environment frame. Evaluations were generally positive from 
September 2005 to the end of 2006, with just over one-fifth (21%) 
of documents evaluating ethanol negatively. Negative evaluations 
become much more prevalent in the 2007 to 2009 period, however, 
with over half (52%) of the documents expressing a negative as-
sessment of ethanol within the environment frame. "is negative 
trend was cemented in 2010 and 2011; almost two-thirds (64%) 
of the documents expressed a negative evaluation of ethanol within 
this frame during this time period. 
Figure 23. Evaluation Score of the Environment Frame, Sept. 
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Agriculture
A document is defined as having used the “agriculture” frame 
if it discusses ethanol as an issue which impacts rural areas and/
or agriculture, including farmers, ranchers, and rural economies. 
"is frame includes discussions of ethanol’s impact on prices for 
agricultural enterprises which depend on grain inputs, including 
livestock and poultry producers. "e use of the agricultural frame 
generally follows the curve of all ethanol discussions, with a large 
peak between 2006 and 2008 and a smaller spike in 2011 (Figure 
24). Figure 25, online shows the proportion of all codeable docu-
ments which contain the agriculture frame over time. A relatively 
small sample makes the graph seem more “volatile” than in reality 
because any month in which no agriculture frame is used appears 
as a zero. Looking past this picket-fence e!ect, the percent of docu-
ments containing the agriculture frame has remained relatively 
constant over time. Much the like economy frame, it appears there 
is little dynamism in the use of the agriculture frame. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, documents using the agriculture 
frame contain a significant number of negative evaluations of etha-
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nol. In fact, about one third of documents which o!er an evaluation 
in this frame are negative, and the majority of evaluations are nega-
tive by mid-2011 (Figure 26). Two possibilities exist for explain-
ing this trend. First, these evaluations may simply be attempting to 
refute the arguments of pro-agricultural ethanol supporters. Many 
of these documents may be conveying the message that “ethanol 
does not help agriculture as much as proponents would have us 
believe.”  "e second possibility is that negatively evaluated agricul-
ture frames highlight the adverse e!ects of ethanol on livestock and 
poultry producers who depend on low grain prices for feed. 
Figure 26. Evaluations in the Agriculture Frame, Sept. 2005 – 
Sept. 2011
Framing in the “Big Picture”
Ethanol has been touted as the solution to several distinct 
problems, including high greenhouse gas emissions, reliance on 
unpredictable Middle Eastern oil supplies, and the “vulnerability” 
of the American farmer (Lehrer 2008, 120-1). "ese pro-ethanol 
frames have been counterbalanced by competing issue definitions 
that evaluate ethanol less favorably. Detractors have argued that 
ethanol subsidies harm the environment, artificially inflate global 
food prices, and unnecessarily deplete federal co!ers. "ese frames 
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have mixed with the together to produce a complex, contested area 
for issue definition. 
"e ethanol issue environment includes both relatively stable 
and relatively dynamic frames. While use of the economy, environ-
ment, and agriculture frames remained fairly constant over time, 
use of the energy dependence, energy prices, food prices, and bud-
get frames changed considerably across this time period. "e en-
ergy frames were much more prevalent from 2006 to mid-2008, 
the food prices frame in 2008, and the budget frame from early 
2011 onwards. All three of these frames are associated with “crises,” 
namely high energy prices, high food prices, and the congressio-
nal budget stalemate. While this may partially explain the tempo-
ral patterns of these frames, it does not explain why the economy 
frame did not show a similar spike beginning around the time of 
the 2007 financial crisis, nor does it explain why the energy and 
food prices frames did not continue to climb with their price indi-
cators after 2008. It appears that significant changes in exogenous 
variables may partially explain, but do not always cause, fluctua-
tions in the use of related frames. Adding another helpful layer 
to this explanation is the role played by changing opinions. "e 
“stable” frames showed a higher incidence of “negative” evaluation 
over time, while the generally positive energy frames receded from 
the frame landscape and generally negative food prices and bud-
get frames increased in frequency. "us both external events and 
changing opinions on ethanol influenced the frame environment 
from September 2005 to September 2011.
CHANGING FRAMES AND EVALUATIONS: THREE 
FINDINGS
Various schools of thought have proposed di!erent theories 
for the process of issue redefinition in Congress and the media. 
Some have argued that Congresspersons strategically influence 
the media, others have proposed a more dynamic mutually-rein-
forcing process, and still others have claimed the media may shape 
congressional frames. "e data analyzed in this thesis show that 
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none of these theories entirely captures the framing and re-framing 
occurring around ethanol policy. "e defining feature of ethanol 
frame transmission, largely ignored by all three of these schools of 
thought, is the role of opinion in determining frame use. Further-
more, the data show that the direction of “influence” is more com-
plicated than simple frame transmission. In many cases, the use of 
a frame by one group diminishes its use by others. 
Finding One: Changing Frames is a Dynamic Process
Out of the seven frame categories analyzed, five show no 
discernible “leader” in any of several studied dyads and triads. In 
the economy, energy dependence, energy prices, environment, and 
agriculture frames, neither the media nor Congress appears to be 
adopting the frame earlier than others. "is result persists when 
frames are measured as a proportion of each document’s represen-
tation in the sample. "is method controls for the slight di!erences 
between the sizes of the CR, national media, and regional media 
samples and also for the larger size of the combined “media” data-
set. Several other scenarios are analyzed, including potential frame 
transmission between: regions, media and Congresspersons from 
the same region, national media and regional media, political par-
ties, and congressional chambers. No leaders are detectable in any 
of these scenarios for any of these five frames. 
Figure 27, online shows the characteristic pattern of “dynam-
ic” frame change in the combined energy frame. Energy is chosen 
simply as an example; the economy, environment, and agriculture 
frames show similar leadership patterns. No “leaders” are present 
in either an absolute or relative sense. As an absolute measure, the 
media and Congresspersons began using the energy frame around 
the same point in time. As a relative measure, both groups tended to 
increase their use of the energy frame at similar times. 
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Figure 28. Use of the Budget Frame in the CR and Media, Sept. 
2005 – Sept. 2011
"e budget and food prices frames, however, show a di!erent 
pattern. Figure 28 shows each document type’s use of the budget 
frame as a percentage of all observations for that document at a 
given time. "e media clearly began using the budget frame before 
members of Congress. In fact, the media intermittently used this 
frame throughout the 2006 to 2009 period while almost no Con-
gresspersons did the same. "e budget was a noticeably minimal 
part of congressional framing until mid-2010. It is questionable, 
however, whether this pattern indicates frame transmission by the 
media.  If the CR was “responding to” the media’s reframing, then 
the CR waited at least three years. In this sense, it is di#cult to con-
ceptualize the media as “leading” and the CR as “following.”  More 
precisely, the media appears to have reframed ethanol as a budget 
issue while Congresspersons refused to follow for an extended pe-
riod of time. Not until 2010, after four years of largely ignoring 
the media’s framing of ethanol as a budget issue, did Congress take 
up the frame in a meaningful way. "is raises an interesting and 
under-explored question about the conditions under which Con-
gress may be inclined to delay or avoid adopting particular frames 
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that are already prevalent in the media. 
Figure 29. Use of the Food Prices Frame in the CR and Media, 
Sept. 2005 – Sept. 2011
"e food prices frame shows a similar congressional “stub-
bornness.”  Figure 29 displays the percentage of CR and media doc-
uments using the frame over time. Initially, it seems that perhaps 
the media was leading an issue reframing in late 2006 and early 
2007. "e CR seemed to respond to the prevalence of the food 
prices frame by mid-2007 with a noticeable uptick in the use of the 
food prices frame by Congresspersons. "is apparent responsive-
ness comes into doubt, however, as we look farther into the future. 
During the period from late 2008 until early 2011, only the media 
used the food prices frame. If the CR is in fact sensitive to changes 
in the media, then we would have expected a similar responsiveness 
in this period. 
Finding Two: The Media Leads Changing Evaluations
While the transmission of frames does not follow a clear lead-
er-follower pattern, the ways in which frames are used to evaluate 
ethanol almost universally show Congress lagging. 
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For every frame except food prices, Congress did not use a 
frame to evaluate ethanol negatively until the media had already 
done so.*  "is trend is most easily seen in the environment frame 
(Figure 30, online). Although overall evaluations in the environ-
ment frame were mostly mixed over time with a slight negative 
trend, Congresspersons showed a distinct resistance to use the 
frame negatively. Not until mid-2008 did the Evaluation Score of 
ethanol in this frame turn negative.
It is unclear to what extent this phenomena reflects “transmis-
sion.”  "e media may be supplying Congresspersons with evidence 
within the frame which convinces them to alter their opinions. In 
the environment frame, for example, more evidence emerged over 
time which questioned ethanol’s contribution to carbon emission 
reductions and highlighted previously unconsidered environmen-
tal externalities. Alternatively, the media may be necessary to “get 
the attention” of ethanol opponents and introduce a new frame into 
their repertoire. "is explanation also depends on the media’s role 
as an evidence-supplier, but it does not assume individual Con-
gresspersons are changing their opinions. Instead, this attention-
grabbing explanation assumes opponents are always “shopping” for 
useful frames, and the media points them to the blue-light specials. 
Finally, the media may be providing opponents “cover” to begin us-
ing a frame negatively. In this explanation, Congresspersons depend 
on the media to educate the public about the potential drawbacks 
and complications of ethanol in a formerly-positive frame. Con-
gresspersons may resist using a generally positive frame to make a 
negative argument because they risk faltering in their explanation 
and boosting the salience of an issue that remains a positive evalu-
ator. For example, talking about ethanol as an environment issue 
but failing to convince listeners that ethanol could be harmful for 
the environment just boosts the cause of the ethanol proponents 
who want ethanol to be seen as an environmental issue. Waiting for 
the media to lay the groundwork reduces the educational costs and 
potential risks to congressional ethanol opponents.
*  Because the food prices frame is an almost entirely negative frame, this one exception is 
unsurprising.  
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Finding Three: Everyone is Avoiding the Argument
"e process of media-to-Congress transmission of negative 
evaluations is stunted, however, by the general resistance of etha-
nol proponents to use frames which are usually “negative” and vice-
versa. If we classify the budget and food prices frames as “gener-
ally negative,” the agriculture and environment frames as “generally 
mixed,” and the economy, energy price, and energy dependence 
frames as “generally positive,” then we see a disproportionate attrac-
tion of ethanol proponents to the “generally positive frames” and 
ethanol opponents to the “generally negative” frames. In general, 
both the congressional Record and Midwest display more favor-
able opinions towards ethanol than other documents and regions, 
while the national media displays decidedly negative opinions (Fig-
ures 8 and 10). Consequently, both the CR and Midwest show a 
disproportionate use of “generally positive” frames and appear to 
avoid using “generally negative” ones while the national media does 
the opposite. 
 Figures 31 and 32 (online) display the “deviation score” of each 
frame’s use from the norm across both regions and document types. 
To generate these scores, each document’s/region’s frame was eval-
uated as a percent of all frames. So, for example, the South’s use of 
the budget frame represented about 38% of all “budget frame” use 
by the various regions. Second, each document’s/region’s share of 
the whole sample was subtracted from this frame-specific percent-
age score. So, because the South represents about 31% of the entire 
sample, the “deviation score” of the budget frame in the South is 
about 7%. Given the South’s overall propensity to discuss etha-
nol, it uses the budget frame slightly more than we would expect. 
"is measure prevents variation in region, document, frame-use, 
and sampling from influencing the score because all deviations are 
measured in comparison to others. "e drawback, however, is that 
in some cases it may be di#cult to determine if, for example, one 
document “over-uses” a frame or if the other two documents are 
“under-using” the frame. "is measure shows us the relative use of 
frames across document types, but because the baseline is a rela-
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tive measure, it does not allow us an analytical angle to determine 
which document type is the “deviant” and which are “normal.” 
Several trends become clear in these two figures. First, the 
generally pro-ethanol Midwest and CR tend to avoid using the 
“generally negative” budget and food frames. "e CR uses about 
5% fewer budget frames than we would expect, which is especial-
ly remarkable given Congress’s featured role in the budget crisis, 
while the Midwest is about 16% below expectations. "is pat-
tern is slightly more pronounced in the food frame, with the CR 
about 16% and the Midwest about 12% below what we would ex-
pect given their prevalence in the dataset. An interesting pattern 
appears in the “generally positive” frames. "e CR uses the energy 
frames more than we would expect, but the Midwest does not. "e 
Midwest does, however, over-use the economy frame, while the CR 
under-uses it. "e causes of these di!erences are likely do to some 
combination of the document’s target audience, author/speaker 
preferences, and sampling error. In any case, both figures show a 
propensity for pro-ethanol groups to over-use at least some “gener-
ally positive” frames. "is pattern also holds true in the reverse for 
ethanol opponents. "e national media uses the budget frame 11% 
more often and the food prices frame 9% more often than we would 
expect given its prevalence in the dataset.  Similarly, the national 
media under-uses the generally positive economy, energy depen-
dence, and energy prices frames by 18%, 6% and 11% respectively. 
"is trend may seem obvious at first glance, but it provides 
some interesting evidence about ethanol debates. "e fact that eth-
anol proponents, measured in the data set as expressing a positive 
opinion towards ethanol policy, do not evaluate ethanol negatively 
in a particular frame is unsurprising. More significant, however, is 
that they do not evaluate ethanol positively in those frames either. In 
essence, proponents (and opponents) are “preaching to the choir,” 
presenting the issues which make ethanol “look good” (or “look 
bad”) as the most salient considerations to ethanol debates. "ey 
do a poor job, however, of addressing the negative frames presented 
by the other side. Instead of acknowledging and minimizing the ef-
fects of ethanol in a particular frame, opponents more often prefer 
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to ignore the frame entirely. 
Towards a Synthesized Model of Reframing
"ese three trends o!er us a valuable first cut at formulating a 
coherent, synthesized theory of issue framing and frame transmis-
sion. First, we should be skeptical of totalizing models that assume 
frames are transmitted through a strictly unidirectional pathway. 
"e results here show that, at least in the case of ethanol, lead-
ers and followers are much more di#cult to pull apart than these 
simplistic theories might suggest. Second, we should pay attention 
not only to frames but also to the evaluations which are assessed 
through those frames. "ese results suggest that the media and 
Congress show distinct patterns in their use of negative evalua-
tions, with the media more willing to “go negative” first. Finally, the 
contours of the frame environment have important implications for 
the tenor of “public debate” over an issue. At least in the ethanol 
case, each side of the issue shows an a#nity for particular frames. 
Facing opposition, proponents tend to emphasize their own frames 
rather than engage the other sides’. Taken together, these three 
findings o!er the beginnings of a more robust understanding of 
framing. In the final chapter, I will attempt to outline one potential 
model and suggest areas for further research. 
WHO REFRAMES, WHEN, AND WHY?
Frame transmission is a complex, poorly understood process. 
In the case of ethanol, I find that for many frames neither the media 
nor Congress appears to be “leading” the other in any meaningful 
way. Rather, changes in external conditions, including high-profile 
events and “crises,” seem to hold at least moderate influence over the 
frames adopted by these two groups. I also find that Congress tends 
to express more positive opinions on ethanol than the media. "is 
preference influences congressional frame adoption in two ways. 
First, Congress appears reluctant to use any given frame negatively, 
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almost always lagging behind the media in “going negative.”  Sec-
ond, Congress appears reluctant to use generally negative-trending 
frames at all, avoiding the opportunity to o!er a reevaluation of 
ethanol in negative frames. 
"is finding cautions against wholesale acceptance of the 
Elite Control or Media Control models of frame transmission. It 
does not appear that that as Entman (1993, 57) fears, elite framing 
need raise “radical doubts about democracy itself.”  Elites certainly 
influence the frame environment, but the existence of independent 
media patterns in this dataset show that in at least some instances, 
the public receives a “frame menu” instead of one coherent message 
from media and congressional elites. "is thesis did not address the 
framing behavior of other political elites, including the president 
and bureaucratic experts in the executive branch, but my findings 
nonetheless addresses this potential threat. If the media and Con-
gress o!er independent and divergent frames to the public, then at 
least two frame “options” will be presented no matter what frames 
other political elites may choose. "is prevents any single elite 
group, including political and media elites, from imposing a sin-
gular, hegemonic frame environment on the public. Furthermore, 
the data here show that even when the media and Congress o!er 
similar frames, the media often short-circuits the potential for po-
litical “manipulation” by o!ering negative evaluations in frames that 
Congress has presented as positive. In essence, even when Congress 
can influence the standards by which we judge a policy, they are 
less e!ective at dictating the opinion that such evaluation generates. 
Conversely, we cannot conclude that the media influences Congress 
in any impactful way. Although the media “leads” on some issues, 
Congress can hardly be said to follow. As evidenced by Congress’s 
selective use of the budget and food prices frames, it appears that 
Congresspersons are highly capable of maintaining autonomy from 
the media. 
Elements from the Institutional Fluidity school, when com-
bined with a more precise focus on di!erences between frame 
adopters and frame avoiders, helps to explain at least part of the 
change in the ethanol frame environment. Baumgartner et al.’s 
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(2009) theory of punctuated equilibrium argues that friction in 
the policymaking system and the inherently limited attention of 
Congresspersons combine to produce uneven, dynamic change. 
"is may explain why the media and Congress, while tending to 
adopt similar frames at similar times, sometimes express uneven or 
unsynchronized frame adoption. 
It seems likely, however, that something other than random 
institutional error is causing Congressperson’s systematic delay in 
“going negative” and overall reticence to utilize generally negative 
frames. "is bias may be at least partially explained by institutional 
features of Congress itself. A strong status quo bias operates on 
congressional policymaking, creating friction against even popu-
lar policy changes (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 217). "is simple in-
stitutional inertia, the product of limited congressional time and 
attention, is dramatically compounded in the ethanol case by a 
strong contingent of pro-ethanol supporters. Together, these fac-
tors would have dissuaded many ethanol opponents from devot-
ing significant e!orts to end ethanol support. Given limited time 
and resources, why fight a losing battle?  "e shock expressed by 
media outlets at the June 2011 vote shows just how crazy the idea 
would have sounded to ethanol opponents in 2006. "us the delay 
in expression of negative opinions in the CR may not necessarily 
indicate that Congress favored ethanol support. Rather, it simply 
shows that opponents quite literally were unwilling to “waste their 
breath” on a fight they could not win. 
Viewed from this angle, the media may have laid essential 
groundwork for congressional opponents of ethanol subsidies. 
From mid-2006 to mid-2008, the media expressed decidedly 
mixed opinions on ethanol even in the face of expressed congres-
sional support. "e media was also willing to evaluate ethanol 
negatively within individual frames much before Congress in most 
cases. "ese negative trends in the media may have sent the critical 
signal to congressional opponents that there was an opening on the 
national agenda for a reconsideration of ethanol support. 
Finally, after the ethanol debate picked up steam in both 
the media and Congress, we see an interesting pattern emerging 
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in the way those debates play out. Instead of engaging the other 
sides’ arguments, both proponents and opponents preferred to 
use their time to emphasize more favorable frames. Baumgartner 
et al. (2009, 114) argue that institutional stickiness explains why 
status quo defenders often ignore the opposition; agenda gatekeep-
ing prevents most reframing attempts from posing a serious threat. 
After an issue has emerged as the site of contested debate, however, 
the ethanol case suggests that both sides might find it advisable 
to strategically ignore inconvenient frames.  We could hypothesize 
that opponents find it more di#cult to beat an argument than to 
distract the public and make us forget it existed. 
"ese hypotheses are only one potential set of interpretations; 
further research is necessary to determine how applicable they may 
be to other issues. "e ethanol case displays a few distinct features 
we may expect to see in other issues following this general pattern. 
First, ethanol itself has long been a relatively salient issue to poli-
ticians and the media. Ethanol has been included in many major 
pieces of legislation and regularly appears in the CR and newspa-
pers. Baumgartner et al. 2009 remind us that most issues which 
receive lobbyists’ attention in Washington are particularistic, fairly 
one-dimensional, and struggling for a few minutes’ meeting time. 
Of the 98 issues in their study, for example, only four underwent 
even a partial reframing (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 176). We should 
expect reframing attempts to be quite di!erent for lower-profile 
policy areas than for issues such as ethanol which have already leapt 
the “attention getting” hurdle. Second, ethanol was characterized by 
a downward trend in both federal support and national opinion 
over time. For issues with little legislative or evaluative change, we 
should expect patterns of frame and especially evaluation transmis-
sion to be much di!erent. Finally, ethanol may be unique in its rela-
tionship to many highly salient issue areas. While many policy ar-
eas could potentially be rhetorically connected to many issue areas, 
ethanol has a scientifically and/or statistically proven relationship 
to areas as diverse as the environment, rural economies, fossil fuel 
displacement, food prices, and more. "ese relationships provide 
rich potential for an issue environment that other policy areas may 
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not. To address all of these potential caveats, further case studies 
are necessary in other areas to create a more robust picture of re-
framing events in American media and Congress.
"is paper could be improved by work in a number of areas. 
Sample sizes could be dramatically increased to produce a more 
robust, complete dataset. Richer data would allow researchers to 
examine finer questions. What association might exist between 
frames used by regional and state media and the frames used by 
Congresspersons from those areas?  Are there frame leaders who 
operate at the scale of days or weeks instead of months?  Does the 
presence of scientific or statistical evidence influence frame or eval-
uation transmission?  "e answers to each of these questions were 
not possible given the size of my sample, but they could provide 
valuable insight into the ethanol case and more generalizable find-
ings. In future studies, researchers may also wish to treat the data 
more statistically than graphically, using multivariate regression to 
determine the significance of the media’s e!ect on congressional 
evaluations when compared to lobbying money, interest group tes-
timony, general patterns of non-ethanol media coverage, interna-
tional crises and prices, Presidential statements, and more. 
"e ethanol case provides a few answers and many more 
puzzles. A closer look at changing frames and opinions over time 
sheds light on the “shocking” June 2011 Senate vote. As ethanol 
became characterized more negatively within frames and framed 
more negatively by additional frames, congressional policy changed 
as well. Who caused these opinions to change, however, is less clear. 
We know that what frames were used, but we do not know why. 
Why did the tide turn against ethanol when it did in mid-2008? 
And why did Congress take a full three years to enact a significant 
policy response?  And if neither the media nor Congress “led” the 
other, then who led both?  "e answers to these questions lie only 
in further investigation of framing e!ects and reframing events in 
American politics.
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